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EMERGENT DUALISM AND  
THE CHALLENGE OF VAGUENESS
Igor Gasparov
In two recent papers, Dean Zimmerman has argued that the vagueness of 
ordinary physical objects poses a challenge for “garden variety” materialism 
(roughly, the view that the subject of conscious experiences is identical with 
the brain or the whole human organism), and that emergent substance dual-
ism can deal more successfully with the problem of vagueness. In this paper I 
try to show that emergent dualism is vulnerable to the challenge of vagueness 
to the same extent as is “garden variety” materialism.
1. Introduction
Dean Zimmerman has recently argued against “garden variety” materi-
alism and in support of emergent substance dualism.1 Whereas garden 
variety materialism claims that I am identical either to the whole human 
organism that is my body or to one of the natural physical parts of my body, 
such as the brain or nervous system, emergent substance dualism identifies 
me, as a subject of conscious experiences, with an immaterial soul caused 
by complex interactions among the physical parts of my brain.2 According 
to Zimmerman, if you believe in the existence of phenomenal properties, 
it is difficult to embrace garden variety materialism. Among entities sug-
gested by garden variety materialism, no appropriate candidates for being 
the subject of my conscious experiences “present themselves,”3 because 
all “natural” material parts of my organism are vague. As Zimmerman 
argues, a materialist intent on preserving belief in qualia must resort to 
highly speculative forms of materialism. This fact in turn opens the door 
for emergent dualism, because the speculations of the emergent dualist 
are no more counter-intuitive than those of the speculative materialist. In 
what follows I argue that Zimmerman’s emergent dualism is vulnerable 
1Dean W. Zimmerman, “From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism,” Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 84 (2010), 119–150; “From Experience to Ex-
periencer,” in The Soul Hypothesis: Investigations in the Existence of the Soul, ed. M. Baker and S. 
Goetz (New York: Continuum, 2011), 168–201.
2The most elaborate account of emergent substance dualism is provided by William 
Hasker in his The Emergent Self (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999).
3Zimmerman, “From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism,” 145.
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to the very problem of vagueness that makes trouble for garden variety 
materialism.4
2. Emergent Dualism and the Problem of Vagueness
To begin, consider the well-known example of a cloud.5 Imagine that you 
observe a single cloud floating in a bright blue sky. As seen from the earth, 
the cloud appears to be at most one. Upon a closer investigation, however, 
it becomes apparent that some water droplets at the edges of the cloud are 
neither clearly part of the cloud nor clearly not part of the cloud. Indeed, 
there are many, largely overlapping, but nevertheless distinct aggregates 
of water molecules each of which is an equally good candidate for being 
the cloud you see in the sky. Given this, it’s natural to revise one’s belief 
that there is a single cloud in the sky, and instead believe either that there 
are no clouds in the sky (but only water molecules), or that there are many 
distinct cloud-like objects in the sky. This may do for clouds, but what 
about for ourselves? Clouds indeed are vague, but what about the person 
who sees a cloud? If you believe yourself to be identical with at most one 
person having now a conscious experience of a cloud, could you turn out 
also to be just as vague as the cloud?
If you hold the view Dean Zimmerman has dubbed “garden variety 
materialism,” your answer should be “yes.” On this view, each human 
person is identical with an ordinary physical object, such as a human body 
or brain. The difficulty, however, is that human bodies and brains are just 
as vague as clouds and mountains. Suppose you are identical with your 
brain. There is no one single thing that is your brain. Instead, where your 
brain is supposed to be, there are many, largely overlapping brain-like 
objects each of which is an equally good candidate for being your brain. 
Which of them is you? It seems that there is no reason to prefer one of the 
candidates over any of the others.
There are surely many ways of dealing with the problem of vagueness. 
But for the sake of argument I accept here that Zimmerman is correct in 
his reflections on the way vagueness raises a challenge for garden variety 
materialism.6 If he is right, then this kind of materialism turns out indeed 
to be a rather implausible account of human persons.
To get a clearer sense of the problem, assume there is a chair in your 
vicinity. Chairs are admittedly vague, but that fact does not matter for 
their ability to fulfill a precise function, namely to provide a place to sit. 
4It might be argued that even if emergent dualism is vulnerable to the vagueness problem 
to the same extent as is garden variety materialism, emergent dualism would still be no 
worse off than garden variety materialism. But, as far as I can see, Zimmerman’s point is 
rather that emergent dualism should be back on the table precisely because garden variety 
materialism suffers from a vagueness problem while emergent dualism does not. If it turns 
out that emergent dualism suffers from problems of vagueness too, the motivation for emer-
gent dualism which Zimmerman provides is undercut.
5David Lewis, “Many, but Almost One,” in David Lewis, Papers in Metaphysics and Episte-
mology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 164.
6Zimmerman, “From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism,” 139–140.
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Even after you have realized that there are many distinct chair-like objects 
in front of you, you do not have to choose which of them to sit down 
on. All of them are in nearly the same place, and are alike in all respects 
relevant for sitting down and, hence, are equally good for serving the role 
of a chair to sit on. In contrast, assume now that the brain is the ultimate 
subject of your conscious experience. Thus, it possesses the first-person 
perspective which is exclusively yours. Notice further that there are many 
distinct brain-like things in the vicinity of your skull, each of which is 
an equally good candidate for being a brain. If a brain is the subject of 
conscious experience and, hence, the bearer of a first-person perspective, 
then each equally good candidate for being a brain should possess its own 
first-person perspective. Then, however, the question naturally arises, 
which of them is you? In other words, the difficulty is that each candidate 
for being my brain will be a thinker on her own.7 Therefore, there are too 
many thinkers where we would have expected just a single one, and there 
is no way to decide which of them is identical with you. This is a problem 
for those who would like to identify a conscious person with the brain or 
with the whole human organism.
Zimmerman contends that one can avoid this problem by adopting a 
form of emergent substance dualism. Instead of identifying you with a 
vague garden variety physical thing, emergent dualists hold that com-
plex interactions among physical particles in your brain bring about the 
existence of a new emergent individual that is the true subject of your 
experience, i.e., is you. This new emergent individual cannot be identified 
with any material object whatsoever, but is an immaterial counterpart to 
your body, a soul.
Unfortunately, emergent dualists have to face the same problem as do 
garden variety materialists.8 This seems to be so for the following reason. 
Suppose there is a set, S, of physical particles interacting with each other 
so as to jointly generate in a lawful manner an emergent soul, a. Further, 
suppose that there is another set, S′, of physical particles most but not 
all of which are members of S. S and S′ are largely over-lapping, equally 
good candidates for being a brain, and so if S generates a soul, then S′ 
should too—call that soul b. Would a be identical to b? Prima facie there is 
no reason why they should be identical. Distinct causes typically produce 
distinct effects. Since a brain is vague, where we would normally think 
7In her critical evaluation of Zimmerman’s paper, Penelope Mackie also reaches the con-
clusion that Zimmerman’s account of vague “garden variety” objects entails the existence 
of a multiplicity of thinkers: “[A] vague GVO [GVO is Mackie’s abbreviation for “garden 
variety object”] can be a thinker only in virtue of the existence of a multiplicity of precise 
candidates for being the GVO, all of which (or whom?) are thinkers.” (Penelope Mackie, 
“Property Dualism and Substance Dualism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 [2011], 
190n8.)
8For the sake of simplicity I speak here only of emergent substance dualism. I think, how-
ever, that a similar criticism would apply to the non-dualist account of emergent individuals 
provided by Timothy O’Connor and Jonathan D. Jacobs, “Emergent Individuals,” The Philo-
sophical Quarterly 53 (2003), 540–555.
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there is “the” brain, there are in fact many different (though largely over-
lapping) sets of particles each of which seems to be appropriate to generate 
an emergent soul. Then, however, each such set would correspond to a 
distinct emergent soul, since, according to the emergent dualist, emergent 
souls are generated in a lawful manner, so that nothing could prevent 
such a soul from arising if its natural cause is present. Thus, it appears 
that there will be a great number of emergent souls associated with “your 
brain.” Which one of them is yours? All are equally eligible for being you. 
Emergent substance dualism seems to suffer from the vagueness problem 
just as much as does garden variety materialism. I think that both garden 
variety materialism and emergent dualism are in trouble here given the 
strength of the intuition that one is the unique bearer of one’s own first-
person perspective and conscious experience.9
3. The Overdetermination Hypothesis
In two recent papers,10 Dean Zimmerman has proposed a way for the 
emergent dualist to avoid the problem of vagueness, suggesting that, in 
a situation of causal overdetermination, many overlapping sets of neural 
events generate only one single soul:
I suppose that the following hypothesis is more likely: that many overlap-
ping sets of events occur in the brain, none of which is the minimal cause of 
the soul’s ongoing existence, nor the single cause of its overall phenomenal 
state. With many overlapping patterns of neural firing, each lawfully suf-
ficient for the existence of a soul with the same phenomenal states, there 
could still be just one soul, its existence and phenomenal state simply over-
determined. There need be no vagueness about which activities in the brain 
generate the subject of consciousness—in fact, on this supposition, many 
precise (and largely overlapping) events are equally responsible—nor about 
how many subjects there are.11
Zimmerman’s Overdetermination Hypothesis includes three main claims. 
First, it denies that there is just one single cause for the existence of a soul. 
Second, it supposes the existence of several distinct sets of largely over-
lapping neural events each of which is sufficient to produce an emergent 
9It might be objected that neither garden variety materialism nor emergent dualism 
are substantially called into question by problems of vagueness. We continue to believe in 
change despite the apparently strong arguments mounted by Zeno. Why then cannot we 
still believe either garden variety materialism or emergent dualism even if there is an ap-
parently strong argument against them? I think this analogy cannot be applied here since 
the trouble with garden variety materialism and emergent dualism is that both, if the argu-
ment presented above is correct, undermine our basic conviction that we are the unique and 
genuine subjects of our experience. Yes, we could be justified in holding some of our deep 
and important beliefs despite there being some arguments against them. But I think that the 
same is not true of our theories if they claim to account for one of our most basic intuitions 
(such as the uniqueness of the subject of conscious experience) on the one hand, and yet on 
the other entail a consequence which is incompatible with the very same basic intuition (as 
the existence of many thinkers instead of just a single one seems to be).
10See footnote 1.
11Zimmerman, “From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism,” 146–147.
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soul in a lawful manner. And, third, it claims that the existence of just one 
single emergent soul with its overall phenomenal state is overdetermined 
by the totality of all these neural events. Vagueness is removed because 
each neural event is precise and there is no question which set of such 
events is the cause of the emergent soul. Since all neural events occurring 
in a brain cause a single soul, there is no question about whose soul it 
is. Thus, it appears that the Overdetermination Hypothesis would save 
emergent dualism from the problem of vagueness. But let us examine the 
issue more closely.
4. Some Troubles for the Overdetermination Hypothesis
Although the Overdetermination Hypothesis has its merits, it is also af-
flicted with some serious problems. There are at least two aspects that 
are questionable. The first is that either Zimmerman’s appeal to overdeter-
mination is ad hoc or a garden variety materialist could invoke it as well. 
Indeed why should we suppose that many distinct and precise causes 
yield just one precise effect, rather than many? Is there any reason that 
convincingly speaks in favor of this supposition, beyond the need for a 
single subject of conscious experience?
Consider the case when two or more bullets simultaneously do cause 
just one single hole in a wall. At first glance, it appears in this case that 
many distinct precise events jointly cause just a single event. The problem, 
however, is that each of the distinct bullets would cause its own part of 
the destruction in the wall. The talk of many bullets causing one hole is 
imprecise. At the fundamental level each precise cause is related to its 
own precise outcome. Applying this claim to a hypothetical process of 
soul generation, it seems to follow that whenever there is a distinct precise 
physical cause sufficient for the production of a soul, that cause should 
yield its own precise outcome. Thus, many distinct precise brain processes 
each lawfully sufficient for the generation of an emergent soul should and 
presumably would produce many distinct souls rather than just one.12
Still, if one is willing to accept the Overdetermination Hypothesis, why 
not say that many precise neural events overdetermine just one single 
physical entity,—the brain*,—that is the unique bearer of the precise phe-
nomenal properties? I don’t believe that this is a good idea in itself, but 
if the overdetermination of the soul should be allowed, why shouldn’t 
the overdetermination of its physical counterpart? It may be well asked: 
what kind of entity is the brain* supposed to be? The materialist could 
reply that even if nobody knows the precise way in which this new mate-
rial thing comes into existence, it is a causal effect of many overlapping 
12The point here is not so much to deny the possibility of overdetermination as such. It 
might possibly be the case that a set of physical particles shaped as a bust of Aristotle and the 
bust itself, although they are two distinct entities, cause just one single effect. What I claim 
here is that two different and not coinciding entities such as two different sets of neurons 
could not cause just one single effect, if the effect in question is supposed to be non-vague. I 
take it to be a conceptual matter, rather than a matter of probability.
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neural events which produce it by overdetermination. For this reason a 
proponent of garden variety materialism could claim that the brain* is 
neither vague nor identical to any of equally eligible candidates for being 
the brain. Rather, it is a new, emergent entity, to be compared with the 
(alleged) emergent soul in respect of its origin but purely physical. (Could 
this count as a form of speculative materialism of which Zimmerman 
speaks? I think not. As far as I understood Zimmerman, he claims that 
speculative materialism should identify me with a precise part of a brain 
which is to be discovered by scientific speculation.13 In contrast the ac-
count of the brain* is merely supposed to be a philosophical account of 
what the brain (of ordinary discourse) in fact is.) So, I think, a proponent 
of the Overdetermination Hypothesis is confronted with a dilemma: 
Either she has to acknowledge that the overdetermination solution is ad 
hoc or concede that a garden variety materialist may invoke it as well to 
bolster her position.
Second, there seems to be another, more serious problem for the 
Overdetermination Hypothesis, one that concerns the precise temporal 
beginning of an emergent soul. According to the Overdetermination 
Hypothesis, many overlapping patterns of neural firing causally overde-
termine the existence of my soul. But patterns of neural firing can overlap 
in time as well as in terms of the physical particles which they involve. 
Because these patterns of neural firing contain so many constituent sub-
events (at the atomic or sub-atomic level), and because these processes are 
unlikely to have clear-cut temporal beginnings or endings (times at which 
we could say, the relevant process starts exactly now, and ends exactly 
now), it is very likely that for any pattern of neural firing which is a good 
candidate for being a pattern sufficient for the generation of a soul, there 
will also be many other equally good candidates that begin or end slightly 
earlier or slightly later.
But it appears that any emergent soul must necessarily have a begin-
ning in time, because it is the result of natural causal processes occurring 
over time. Moreover, an emergent soul, in order to be a non-vague entity, 
should have a precise time of temporal beginning.14 Let t be the precise 
time at which my emergent soul s began to exist. From this it would follow 
that no neural activities sufficient to produce s occurred before t. But this 
should strike us as very unlikely, for the reason given in the previous para-
graph. Any pattern of neural firing which is a good candidate for being 
“the first neural process to generate my soul” will likely be just one among 
very many processes which have slightly different times of initiation or 
13Zimmerman, “From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism,” 143.
14The material processes which (are supposed to) causally produce the soul are in time. 
If a natural cause is in time, its natural effect must be in time as well. If emergent dualism is 
true, then the soul must be produced in time as an effect of underlying physical processes. If 
the soul is produced in time, then either there is a first moment at which the soul comes into 
existence or the soul is temporally vague. Thus if the emergent soul has to be a non-vague 
entity, then it must have a first moment of its existence.
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termination, but which are nonetheless equally good candidates for being 
a process sufficient for the generation of a soul. If it was a problem for the 
garden variety materialist that, at a single time, there are many equally 
good candidates for “the physical object which is my brain,” then it should 
be just as much of a problem for the emergent dualist that, occurring at 
slightly different times, there are many equally good candidate processes 
for “the neural process which first generates my soul.”
5. Conclusion
By way of conclusion, I want to emphasize that Zimmerman’s argument 
presents a strong case against garden variety materialism. Yet, the emer-
gent substance dualism which Zimmerman proposes is itself subject to 
difficulties involving vagueness. In my view, the main reason for this is the 
lawful causal dependence of the emergent soul on the physical processes 
going on in the brain. This feature, which the emergent dualist believes 
to be an advantage of her account, enabling her to include the soul in the 
natural order, turns out instead to be a “Trojan horse” through which the 
problem of vagueness casts its shadow on the emergent soul, making it 
inappropriate for being the unique bearer of my conscious experience.15
Voronezh State Medical University
15I’m grateful for helpful discussions on the material of this paper with Hans Halvorson, 
Michael Loux, Michael Rota and Eleonore Stump at a Ratio project workshop in Moscow. 
Many thanks also to the John Templeton Foundation for funding that workshop, and to 
Thomas Flint and two anonymous referees from Faith and Philosophy for their insightful com-
ments on earlier drafts.
